Modeling the effect of bike-and-ride mode on the competing public transit market in a linear monocentric city

Abstract

This paper investigates the interactions between transit operators when bike-train integration is implemented by a private transit operator. A Bertrand-Nash bi-level inter-modal equilibrium model for a deregulated transit market is introduced to describe the fare competition between two oligopolistic transit operators, bus and train, in a linear monocentric city. The transit market is assumed to be a profit-maximizing duopoly that competes non-cooperatively. Traveler behavior is assumed to be a deterministic user equilibrium transit assignment. As the operator offering bike-and-ride mode, the train operator can determine the locations to provide bikeand-ride facilities. Numerical examples are provided to show that this combined mode changes the pricing strategies for both operators and how the saved access time by cycling alters the market share and profit of both transit operators.